As physicians continue to prescribe more and more drugs, plaintiff's attorneys in the wake of tort reform are attempting to carve out or create informed consent cases based on the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) labeling requirements and the doctors' communications with their patients as it relates to those requirements. The theory of tort litigation revolves around whether the doctor disclosed to his patient the fact that he prescribed a drug in an 'off-label' manner, or for a purpose not approved by the FDA's testing process. This article argues that the doctor's decision to inform the patient of the 'off-label' status of the prescription is not relevant to the physician's standard of care for an informed consent case. First, the FDA has specifically stated that its procedures and requirements have no effect on the practice of medicine and that the FDA does not prohibit doctors from prescribing drugs in an 'off-label' manner. Second, the FDA's approval of a drug is immaterial to the effectiveness in the drug's 'off-label' use. In fact, prescribing medication in an 'off-label' manner can constitute the standard of care in many cases. Third, a doctor's duty is to practice medicine and treat his patient, not inform the patient of the FDA's non-medically related labeling. Therefore, doctors should not be branded with the additional duty of disclosing non-pertinent information, such as the FDA's medically irrelevant distinction, to their patients.
The FDA's present approval process for prescription of drugs
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) now 'plays a role in almost every aspect of the approval, marketing, labeling, advertising, and promotion of both over-the-counter and prescription drugs.' 1 A company may spend six to eight years and up to $1.7 billion dollars getting a drug approved by the FDA. 2 The FDA will ultimately approve only 40-60% of all drugs submitted for its review. 3 The FDA will approve a drug after the drug has successfully navigated a preclinical study and three FDA phases of clinical testing. 4 Thus, the process to obtain FDA approval is laborious and expensive.
If the drug is found to be safe and effective through all three phases, the company may then submit a new drug application with the FDA. 5 The new drug application will include the results of the preclinical animal trials and of the human clinical studies, the drug's ingredients and components, detailed chemical and biological information, a summary of the risks and benefits, the manufacturing, processing and packaging methods, an environmental impact statement and samples of the proposed labeling. 6 All this information is submitted so that the FDA has a sufficient amount of information to determine: '(1) if the drug is safe [and] effective in its proposed use(s) and whether the benefits of the drug outweigh its risks; (2) whether the proposed labeling is appropriate and what (if anything) should be changed; and (3) whether the methods used in manufacturing the drug and the controls used to maintain its quality are adequate.' 7 The drug's labeling requirements are comprehensive. 8 The FDA considers the label to be the 'display of written, printed, or graphic matter upon the immediate container of any article [y] .' 9 ' 'Labeling' means all labels and other written, printed or graphic matter (1) upon any article or any of its containers or wrappers, or (2) accompanying such article.' 9 In other words, the drug's label is 'all labels and other written, printed, or graphic matter' on any article, container or wrapper of the product and any other item that may accompany those items. 10 Specifically, labeling includes any 'brochures, booklets, mailing pieces, detailing pieces, file cards, bulletins, calendars, price lists, catalogs, house organs, letters, motion picture films, film strips, lantern slides, sound recordings, exhibits, literature and reprints [y] and references published [y] for use by medical practitioners, pharmacists, or nurses [y] .' 11 Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court found that the word 'accompanying' means any 'matter that supplements or explains the product.' 12 Thus, the matter does not have to be physically attached to the product but rather only needs a textual relationship to it. 13 Thus, ' [l] abeling is generally understood to include any written material that supplements or explains the product, is disseminated by the manufacturer, and reaches the customer, doctor, or patient either before, with, or after the product.' 14 Moreover, the drug's official 'labeling cannot contain instructions for off-label uses [y] . ' 15 As such, ' [m]anufacturers can still be prosecuted for illegally 'misbranding' a drug if the drug's labeling includes information about its unapproved uses.' 16 The label of a drug or device is misbranded 'if its labeling [contains] false or misleading information.' 17 In particular, a label may be misbranded in one of the following two ways: (1) the information found on the label and (2) the information omitted from the label. 18 Thus, the drug is considered misbranded if every intended use is not listed or if it fails to contain adequate instructions for each use. 19 In determining whether a label is misbranded, the FDA will consider not only any 'representations made or suggested by statement, word, design [and/ or] device [y] but also the extent to which the labeling or advertising fails to reveal [material] facts.' 20 Interestingly, upon a physician's request, a manufacturer may, however, supply the physician with any information the manufacturer wishes regarding the drug's off-label uses. 21 If the FDA does approve the drug for public marketing, 'the drug can be marketed for the uses for which it was investigated and labeled.' 22 Even after the FDA has cleared the drug to be marketed, the FDA still monitors the drug and has the power to order a change in its label or to order a complete recall of the drug. 22 The FDA also does extensive investigations of the manufacturing facility's production of the drug, including the purchase of raw materials, its manufacturing process and its security. 23 The FDA regulation of off-label uses of prescription drugs Once a drug is approved for a specific purpose, the drug can then be used for any purpose, even if the FDA did not approve of that purpose. 24 Using the drug for a purpose not indicated on its FDAapproved label is called an 'off-label' practice. 25 Off-label practices can happen in the following three ways: (1) use by patients, (2) prescribed by physicians or (3) marketed by manufacturers. 25 Specifically, a physician may prescribe a drug off-label 'to treat unapproved conditions or in unindicated combination, dosage amount, or frequency.' 25 When Congress passed the 1997 Act, Congress ensured that the FDA would not interfere with a physician's practice of medicine. Within the 1997 Act, Congress included the following limitation to the FDA's power: 'Nothing in this Act shall be construed to limit or interfere with the authority of a health care practitioner to prescribe or administer any legally marketed device to a patient for any condition or disease within a legitimate health-carepractitioner-patient relationship.' 26 As such, Congress' caveat in the 1997 Act clearly restrains the FDA from entering into the province of a physician's care of a patient.
The FDA has consistently shown refrain from entering into that province. An FDA Drug Bulletin states that 'once a [drug] product has been approved for marketing, a physician may prescribe it for uses or in treatment regimens or patient populations that are not included in the approved labeling.' 27 In that same Bulletin, the FDA also states that ' 'unapproved' or more precisely 'unlabeled' uses may be appropriate and rational in certain circumstances, and may, in fact reflect approaches to drug therapy that have been extensively reported in medical literature [y] .' 27 The agency further commented that ' [v] alid new uses for drugs already on the market are often first discovered through serendipitous observations and therapeutic innovations [y] .' 27 The agency has reaffirmed this position numerous times. 28 Historically, neither Congress nor the FDA has tried 'to regulate the off-label use of drugs by doctors by limiting prescribing choices.' 29 The FDA has no power to limit a physician from prescribing a drug for off-label purposes, 30 as the FDA does not regulate the practice of medicine. 31 The FDA does not interfere with a doctor's ability to prescribe drugs off-label due to the physician's need to treat each patient individually. 32 Accordingly, the FDA does not have the power to interfere. Furthermore, the FDA has no power to regulate how an individual patient will use a medication prescribed by his or her physician.
The FDA is, however, able to regulate one of the three off-label practices: the manufacturer's marketing and selling of the drug. 33 (A drug manufacturer markets a drug off-label when it promotes a product for non-FDA-approved purposes, users, dosages or combinations.) 33 Despite the FDA's lack of power to intervene in a doctor's ability to prescribe drugs offlabel, Congress passed legislation to allow the FDA to regulate how a drug manufacturer disseminates off-label information. 30 Prior to 1997, a manufacturer could only promote an FDA-approved drug for its FDA-approved purposes. 34 In 1997, however, Congress passed 'the first major drug reform legislation in thirty five years.' 35 The 1997 Act was enacted in an effort 'to protect the public's health and safety by ensuring distribution of only truthful, nonmisleading information regarding uses of prescription drugs.' 36 More specifically, the Act was initiated to allow the FDA to control the manner in which a drug manufacturer distributed information of a drug's off-label uses to physicians in enduring materials. 37 This Act, however, as the FDA admits, is 'one of the most demanding challenges faced by the agency in its 92 year history.' 38 Importantly, Congress again expressly admitted that its legislation does not interfere with a physician's practice of medicine. Congress stated that the legislation is not 'to limit or interfere with the authority of health care practitioner to prescribe or administer any legally marketed device[/drug] to a patient for any condition or disease within a legitimate health care practitioner-patient relationship.' 39 Nonetheless, concerning this legislation and the FDA, with its interest in promoting public health, the information provided by a manufacturer to a doctor may be incomplete, thus leaving doctors less than fully informed about the drug. 40 As one court stated, even truthful information may be misleading, as a company may provide to the physician 'one article that supports use of their drug, even if there exists considerable evidence to the contrary.' 41 The FDA was also concerned that a manufacturer may try to bypass the FDA's extensive and expensive regulations by simply disseminating information about their drug's off-label uses. 42 Since the FDA restricts how a manufacturer may directly disseminate information, manufacturers have promoted its products' off-label value through indirect means. The indirect methods are usually more educationally focused. 43 The most common indirect methods of promotion are the following: (1) pharmaceutical company sponsored research published in editorials in scientific journals and (2) medical education programs for doctors. 44 In fact, the 1997 Act specifically allows a manufacturer to distribute peer-reviewed articles and medical texts to physicians. 45 The 1997 Act allows pharmaceutical companies 'to promote off-label drug uses by disseminating peerreviewed articles from scientific or medical journals or reference textbooks that include information about a clinical investigation of the product to physicians.' 46 The Act states that a drug manufacturer is allowed to distribute 'written information concerning the safety, effectiveness, or benefit of a use not described in the approved labeling of a drug.' 47 The manufacturer can disseminate that information only to certain parties as follows: '(1) a health care practitioner; (2) a pharmacy benefit manager; (3) a health insurance issuer; (4) a group health plan; or (5) a Federal or State governmental agency.' 48 Although the manufacturer is allowed to disseminate this information to those parties, the 1997 Act puts certain restrictions on the actual information that is published. 49 The manufacturer may distribute information on a new use if (1) a new drug application has been filed; 50 (2) the information does not pose a significant risk to the public health and is not abridged, false or misleading; 51 (3) the information is not from another manufacturer's clinical research unless permission was obtained from that manufacturer to do so; 52 (4) a copy of the information was submitted to the FDA 60 days before dissemination 53 and (5) the manufacturer submitted a supplemental application to the FDA or qualified for an exemption to this requirement. 54 Finally, the manufacturer must also include with this information a 'prominently displayed statement,' 55 disclosing, among other things, that the information is for a drug not approved by the FDA, 56 the manufacturer is distributing the information at its own cost 57 and the official labeling with all updates.
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A manufacturer may not specifically request a reference textbook to be published for the product.
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Of course, Congress has delegated the power to regulate the distribution of this off-label information to the FDA. 60 The FDA requires that the information supplied by the manufacturer must still be 'a fair balance of information between the effectiveness and risks of a drug as well as any significant limitations to the product's use.' 61 Although the FDA under the 1997 Act can 'strictly control any dissemination of information on a product's off-label use by its manufacturer,' 62 the Act is 'not intended to restrict the full exchange of scientific information concerning the drug, including dissemination of scientific findings in scientific or lay media.' 63 As such, the FDA is not able 'to regulate activities that are independent and nonpromotional,' 64 such as 'independent scientific studies, conversations between doctors, etc.' 66 There is an exception to this general rule for pharmaceutical drug manufacturers, the Learned Intermediary Doctrine. 67 'The Learned Intermediary Doctrine redirects the warning from the consumer, as is typically required under products law, to the health care provider, who then is expected to read, understand, and evaluate those risks in applying pharmaceutical therapies in the health care milieu.' 68 'The Learned Intermediary Doctrine does not relieve the manufacturer of liability to the ultimate user for an inadequate or misleading warning; it only provides that the warning reaches the ultimate user, the learned intermediary.' 69 Thus, once the manufacturer has given the prescribing physician an adequate warning and appraisal of the drug, the manufacturer has fulfilled its duty, and the Learned Intermediary Doctrine then discharges the manufacturer from liability, making the prescribing physician potentially liable. 70 Although the Learned Intermediary Doctrine is applied on a case-by-case basis, 'it is applied almost universally in cases involving prescriptions drugs and medical devices because the doctrine takes into account the complex role physicians play in the treatment of patients.' 71 The Learned Intermediary Doctrine absolves a manufacturer from liability arising from its prescription drugs. Once the manufacturer sufficiently reports the drug's inherent risks and side effects to the learned intermediary, the manufacturer is then cloaked with the protection of the doctrine. 72 Moreover, the manufacturer, while obligated to warn the prescribing physicians, has no duty to warn the drug's user (the customer) about any risks related to the product's use. 73 Further, a manufacturer needs only to educate the physician about dangerous qualities that are known or should be known to the manufacturer. 74 The manufacturer must still, however, monitor the drug's use for any new risks. 75 The pharmaceutical company is still 'held to a duty to only inform the doctors [y].' 76 The Learned Intermediary Doctrine, while pardoning the manufacturer, potentially places liability upon the learned intermediary, the prescribing physician. 77 The prescribing doctor is the learned intermediary because of his education, experience and unique position as the interchange between the company, its product and the end user (the customer).
The manufacturer must, however, convey a sufficient warning to the physician. The manufacturer's warning to the learned intermediary should 'convey any risk or contraindication that the manufacturer knows, or should know, is associated with the use of the prescription drug.' 78 This then invokes the physician's duty.
'It is the physician's duty to adequately weigh the risks and rewards of a particular course of treatment when prescribing medication.' 79 'Whether the physician has met this duty depends not only on the warnings provided by the manufacturer, but also the prevailing knowledge of the field.' 79 'An adequate warning is one 'that a reasonably prudent person in the same or similar circumstances would have provided with respect to the danger and that communicates adequate information on the dangers and safe use of the product... in the case of prescription drugs, taking into account the characteristics of, and the ordinary knowledge common to, the prescribing physician.'
80 ' [T]he adequacy of the warnings becomes a question of law when the warnings are clear and unambiguous.' 81 The courts, rather than the legislature, created the Learned Intermediary Doctrine on the basis that the doctor is in the best position to evaluate the patient and to assess and recommend the risks and benefits of a particular course of treatment. 82 Worth noting is that a few exceptions to the Learned Intermediary Doctrine do exist. The exceptions are limited though and have been carved out by the courts. The exceptions 'includ[e] mass immunizations, 83 contraceptives, 84 and the controversial 'FDA-Mandate' exception.' 85 For the most part, 'the manufacturer should not be exposed to tort liability for any defect in labelling' 'when a physician, as a learned intermediary, has been provided with the indications for which a drug is effective, but prescribes it for a non-indicated use.' 86 Further, 'where a physician had independent knowledge of the risks, and failed to communicate them to the patient, then the manufacturer may not be liable for its failure to disclose the same risks.' 87 When a physician uses a product off-label, a manufacturer is not subject to liability, even if the manufacturer knows of the off-label use. 88 Physicians' potential liability for prescribing medication off-label 'The major thrust of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine is to protect drug manufacturers from liability for failure to warn and leave the injured patient with only an action against the physician for failure to obtain the patient's informed consent.' 89 Outside of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, physicians also engage in a common but often publicly misunderstood practice of prescribing drugs off-label. A drug is prescribed 'off-label' when a physician administers the drug for a purpose that is not indicated on the drug's FDA-approved label. 90 Since 'over 125 000 patients die [every year] as a direct result of using a prescription drug, ' 91 the misunderstood nature of prescribing drugs off-label and its implications raise serious issues. This concern is heightened by the fact 'that forty to sixty percent of all drugs prescribed are for unapproved uses.' 92 Off-label drug use WA Meadows and BD Hollowell As discussed above, the FDA does not prohibit nor regulate a physician from prescribing a drug offlabel. The FDA's intended mission is to regulate the pharmaceutical industry without interfering with the practice of medicine. 93 As such, '[a]llowing physicians to prescribe drugs for such 'off-label' usage 'is an accepted and necessary corollary of the FDA's mission [y]' ' 94 and can be the standard of care in many fields. 95 Further, ' [o]ff-label use is not only legal and ethical but is a common and integral feature of medical practice.' 96 Prescribing drugs off-label 'is widespread in the medical community,' 97 and 'medical ethics, the FDA and most courts recognize' that prescribing a drug off-label 'is essential to giving patients optimal medical care.' 97 As such, circumstances may mandate a physician to prescribe a drug in an off-label manner.
'Prescriptions for off-label uses of drug products 'may account for more than 25% of the approximately 1.6 billion prescriptions written each year, with some recent estimates running as high as 60%.' 98 In 1995, the American Medical Association reported 'that approximately half of all prescriptions were written for off-label uses.' 99 [y] For a product to have the most effective potential benefits, law and regulation should and must follow, not precede, science. There are too many variations in clinical circumstances and too much time delay in regulations to allow the government to impede the physician's ability to practice in these regards when it is medically appropriate.
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A doctor also has a need to prescribe drugs off-label because of 'orphan diseases,' diseases that have populations too small or that are too rare for a manufacturer to 'have the financial incentive to spend the time or resources necessary to obtain FDA approval for a drug treatment.' 103 Manufacturers may lack an incentive to get approved for the offlabel uses because '[s]eeking approval for [off-label] uses would likely have little effect on drug sales, so the benefit to drug manufacturers does not outweigh the costs of the approval process.' 104 Further, 'when new uses are discovered, less than the entire patent term remains for the drug. Therefore, even with extended patent terms, it is difficult for a drug manufacturer to recover its investment in having an off-label use approved.' 105 Thus, prescribing a drug off-label may be the standard, if not the only method for treating a patient who has an orphan disease.
'Examples of medical conditions whose standard treatments involve or have involved extensive offlabel use include cancer, heart and circulatory disease, AIDS, kidney diseases requiring dialysis, osteoporosis, spinal fusion surgery, and various uncommon diseases.' 106 In these areas of medicine, the percentage of drugs that are being prescribed offlabel is staggering. 'Ninety-five percent of drugs used in neonatology are used off-label.' 107 The National Organization for Rare Diseases reports that for patients to have any treatment at all '90 percent [of the patients] must rely on off-label uses.' 108 'A General Accounting Office study found that about one-third of all drug treatment for cancer involved off-label drug uses.' 109 'The study also found that [y] all major types of cancer studied had been treated through off-label drug uses, and off-label uses accounted for 85 percent of the prescriptions of three popular cancer drugs.' 110 In fact, '[m]ost diseases afflicting fewer than 200 000 Americans are totally without FDA-labeled treatment.' 111 'Since so few drugs are approved for use in children, the use of off-label prescribing is especially prevalent in the realm of pediatric care.' 112 According to the American Academy of Pediatrics, '80 percent of drugs prescribed for children are administered for unindicated uses,' 113 and another study estimates that '80 percent to 90 percent of pediatric patients are receiving off-label drug prescriptions. ' 114 Thus, '[p]ediatric uses also are mostly off-label.' 115 As such, a physician left with little to no viable options for treating a patient with FDAapproved medication may, and sometimes must, rely on off-label prescriptions.
' [T] he availability of such off-label uses is critically important to saving hundreds of thousands of lives each year.' 116 Thus, physicians in an effort to best serve their patients commonly prescribe drug's off-label.
Further, while attempting to comport with the standard of care (and ultimately avoid liability), a physician may actually commit malpractice by not prescribing a drug off-label. ' ' The only certain conclusion is that FDA considers the product generally safe enough to be on the market. ' 121 Admittedly, '[t]he status of the drug with the FDA does not alter the relationship between drug manufacturer, physician and patient.' 124 Informed consent: a physician's duty to disclose the off-label status of a drug Although a physician's '[f]ailure to inform patients that the treatment they are receiving is an off-label application does not, in itself, constitute malpractice, ' 125 plaintiffs' attorneys in medical malpractice cases have tried to fashion informed consent cases around the fact that a physician did not inform his patient that the drug was prescribed in an off-label manner from its FDA-approved use.
'Examination of state informed consent laws thus reveals that a physician's duty is almost universally limited to providing medical information.' 126 'There is no duty obligating a physician to discuss FDA regulatory status of products being used for a particular treatment because FDA regulatory status is not a risk, benefit, or alternative of medical treatment, nor does a product's legal status affect the nature of the treatment. ' 126 'Thus, the fact that FDA has not approved labeling of a drug for a particular use does not necessarily bear on those uses of the drug that are established within the medical and scientific community as medically appropriate.' 127 Consequently, '[t]he mere fact that the FDA has not cleared a product for a particular use does not mean that the product is not in fact suitable for that purpose; it simply means that the FDA has not cleared it.' 128 As such, 'the fact that a medical device[/drug] has not been approved by the FDA for a particular use does not mean that the device is unsafe, much less that the device is defective;' 129 it could simply mean that the 'FDA lacked sufficient information to make an affirmative finding of safety or effectiveness' or that 'the manufacturer never submitted an application concerning the use to the FDA.' 130 ' [T]he majority of reported cases hold that as a matter of law doctors are not required to disclose the FDA status of [a device] because such status is not a medical risk of surgery.' 131 The holding of these cases are based on the premise that the FDA status of a product 'is not a 'medical risk' and thus need not be disclosed in obtaining a patient's informed consent.' 132 In fact, '[t]he FDA labels given to a medical device do not speak directly to the medical issues surrounding a particular surgery. They are not, therefore, required to be disclosed pursuant to the law of informed consent.' 133 'The New Jersey legislature found that off-label use 'is legal when prescribed in a medically appropriate way,' 'conform[s] to the way in which appropriate medical treatment is provided,' and is often 'necessary and appropriate treatment.' ' 134 ' [P]hysicians' prescribing a drug or device off-label have a responsibility to be well-informed about the drug or device.' 135 A physician can be held liable in a negligence claim if he prescribed the off-label drug in that is a 'sufficiently careless, imprudent or unprofessional.' 136 A doctor may be held liable based on an informed consent theory. 'Informed consent doctrine emerged from the intentional tort battery.' 137 'In order to avoid the risk of liability for unlawfully intruding into someone's personal space, a healthcare professional would have to secure his or her patient's consent before performing a surgical or other therapeutic intervention.' 137 A claim based on informed consent has moved from a battery and is now 'firmly rooted in the law of negligence.' 137 ' [T]he duty to secure informed consent reflects a commitment to patient autonomy and self-determination.' 137 An informed consent claim may still be a viable cause of action 'in those jurisdictions defining disclosure sufficient to obtain informed consent as all information material to a reasonable person.' 138 Even in those jurisdictions, the plaintiff would still need to prove that had the patient known that the drug prescribed was off-label, the patient would have refused the treatment. 138 Proving that might be particularly difficult 'given that off-label use is frequently a treatment of last resort.' 138 A state appellate court in Ohio has held that a physician did not have a duty to disclose the FDA status of a device when the device was used Off-label drug use WA Meadows and BD Hollowell off-label. 139 In Klein v. Biscup, a patient sued her physician claiming the physician failed to obtain her informed consent since the doctor failed to disclose that the devices used for her back surgery were not approved by the FDA. 140 The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant. The court of appeals affirmed. The court of appeals held that a physician's failure to disclose the FDA status of a product is not a breach of the physician's duty to obtain the patient's informed consent. 141 In Klein, although the FDA had twice denied the manufacturing company's application to market the surgical screws as a device for spinal implants, the FDA eventually approved the screws for use in long and flat bones. 140 The doctor, however, proposed to use the screws, not on the patient's long or flat bones but to stabilize the patient's spine by fusing several vertebrae. 140 Before the first and second surgeries, the patient signed consent forms which acknowledged that the doctor had informed her of the risks involved with the surgery. The surgeon did not advise her about the FDA status of the screws or that the screws were being employed in an off-label use. 140 The physician argued that he fully informed the patient of the medical risks associated with the procedure and that the FDA status of the screws was not a medical risk. 142 This argument was based on the fact 'that the FDA does not regulate the practice of medicine, and therefore the FDA status of the devices was wholly irrelevant to the issue of informed consent.' 142 The court of appeals found that the '[o]ff-label use of a medical device is not a material risk inherently involved in a proposed therapy which a physician should disclose to a patient prior to the therapy.' 143 Further, 'the off-label use of a medical device is also a matter of medical judgment and, as such, subjects a physician to professional liability for exercising professional medical judgment.' 144 Thus, the court held that, although a physician may be negligent in his judgment to use a device, a physician has not breached his duty to obtain a patient's informed consent by failing to disclose whether the device is being used off-label or the FDA status of the device.
In a case similar to Klein, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Southard v. Temple University Hospital held that a physician's failure to inform a patient of the FDA's classification of a device was not a failure to obtain a patient's informed consent. 145 In Southard, the plaintiffs sued the defendant doctors, alleging that the physicians were obligated to advise patients of the FDA's regulatory classification of a device. 146 The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant doctors on plaintiff's informed consent claim. 146 The appellate court reversed the trial court's granting of summary judgment. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court.
The appellate court found that summary judgment was improper due to the FDA's classification of the device. 147 The court found that the device had risks because the FDA's classification constituted a conclusion that the FDA believed the device had unknown characteristics. 148 Alternatively, the appellate court found that unknown characteristics, if not risks, were at least facts directly related to the surgical procedure and to medical issues involving the surgery. 148 Thus, the appellate court found that 'a reasonable person, if adequately informed, might opt for a more conventional FDA-approved mode of treatment, and concluded that at the least, an issue of fact remained for the jury.' 148 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court disagreed. The court found the FDA label 'do[es] not speak directly to the medical issues surrounding a particular surgery' 149 and 'does not constitute a material fact, risk, complication or alternative to a surgical procedure. ' 150 It found that the FDA's classification of a device relates to how the manufacturer may market and label the device and 'does not enlighten the patient as to the nature or seriousness of the proposed operation [y] or the possible results.' 150 The court also found that the FDA's finding that a device has 'unknown characteristics' does not 'equate to 'risks' or 'facts' pertinent to the informed consent inquiry.' 150 Thus, the Supreme Court held 'that a physician need not inform patients of the FDA classification of a medical device.' 151 A New York trial court has also found that evidence about the FDA status of a drug is admissible for an informed consent case if accompanied with expert testimony. 152 In the case, the plaintiff sued her doctor for malpractice for lack of informed consent. Plaintiff claimed that the doctor should have informed her that drug/injectable substance had not been approved by the FDA for any purpose. The defendant moved to preclude the introduction of the FDA's approval status of the drug.
The trial court found that the admission of the evidence related to the FDA's lack of approval 'would be entirely material and relevant to the issues presented [y] .' 153 The court concluded that a reasonable person, when considering the risks of the drug, 'would want information as to whether that drug or substance has been tested and/or approved by Federal authorities.' 154 The court reasoned that '[i]t is a reasonable assumption that most patients, confronted with a doctor's recommendation for injection of a foreign substance, presume that such substance has been the subject of official testing, consideration, and approval [y] .' 155 The court continued: '[A]nd implicitly or explicitly [the patient will] rely on this presumption as part of the basis of their 'consent' to the treatment. ' 155 In this case, however, the drug had not been approved by the FDA for any purpose. Off-label drug use WA Meadows and BD Hollowell
Courts have also allowed into evidence the fact that a drug was prescribed for an off-label use. In Richardson v. Miller, 156 the plaintiff sued her doctor, alleging that the administration of terbutaline during the plaintiff's labor caused her to suffer a heart attack resulting in permanent heart damage. 157 The trial court granted defendants' motions in limine to preclude reference to the drug's package insert and the Physicians' Desk Reference, which would show that the drug had not been approved by the FDA for the manner prescribed and that it was prescribed off-label. The Tennessee Court of Appeals reversed the trial court on both accounts.
The Richardson court held that the drug's FDA-approved labeling and the Physicians' Desk Reference, when accompanied with other expert evidence on the standard of care, was admissible 'to determine whether the drug presented an unacceptable risk to the patient.' 158 The court did caution that neither, 'by themselves, are prima facie evidence of the prescribing physician's standard of care.'
158 'Thus, proof of a departure from the recommendations in a drug's labeling or PDR reference is not alone sufficient to prove a breach of the standard of care.' 158 The court did state that the materials 'can provide significant assistance in identifying the standard of care.' 158 The court of appeals overturned the trial court's 'wide latitude' regarding the admissibility of evidence by overturning the trial court's preclusion of evidence showing that the drug was prescribed in an off-label manner. 158 The appellate court found that allowing into evidence the absence of FDA-approved instructions regarding recommended dosage levels and methods of administration was relevant to show that the defendant doctor should not have continued the treatment after the plaintiff had experienced chest pain. 159 
Conclusion
Although claims for informed consent based on a doctor's failure to disclose the FDA's status of a drug is a new area, the FDA status of a drug/device is simply not relevant to apprising a patient of the risks involved in a procedure.
First, Congress has expressly represented that the FDA's regulations have no bearing on a physician's practice of medicine. The FDA status of a drug/ device is created by the FDA to enforce its regulations of approval and marketing. Second, the fact that a drug has not been approved by the FDA could be highly prejudicial to a doctor's defense, even if the drug is commonly prescribed for that reason. The trial could lose focus on the critical issue: whether the doctor committed malpractice by prescribing the treatment he did as opposed to why and how the FDA approved the drug. Further, prescribing medication off-label is the norm in most circumstances and constitutes the standard of care. Also, prescribing medication off-label is required for certain fields of practice.
Third, requiring a doctor to disclose that a drug is being prescribed off-label would require the doctor to understand the interworkings and regulations of the FDA and keep abreast of its activity. This task is unduly burdensome. The doctor is trained to practice medicine, not to understanding the administrative ordeals of a large, bureaucratic government agency. Additionally, the doctor would then have to enlighten the patient of what the FDA status means exactly. As such, the FDA's approval process, which is not related to the practice of medicine, is simply irrelevant to the risks of a treatment plan or procedure.
